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After the death of King Mathias (1458-1490) the Turkish-Hungarian frontier re-
mained generally peaceful. But the word "peaceful" should not be taken literally. 
This only meant that large-scale military operations led by the sultan himself did 
not take place. János Hunyadi dealt an annihilating defeat to the Turkish army, 
which had been engaged in the siege of Belgrade in 1456, and since then the 
Turks had been reluctant to launch large-scale military operations against the 
Hungarian Kingdom. King Mathias had kept the situation along the border 
firmly in his hands, and Turkish raids aimed at the realm or her frontiers were 
heavily defeated at the hands of the king's captains. During the reign of king 
Wladyslaw II (1490-1516) nothing seemed to have changed, Turkish raids were 
answered by similar Hungarian incursions into the territory of the Turkish Em-
pire. In fact, the situation was steadily worsening for the Hungarians, the upkeep 
of the border fortresses and the salary of soldiers took up two-thirds of the king's 
revenue.1 
Following the death of Wladyslaw II, his son, the young king Louis II (1516-
1526) sought to keep up the peace with the Turks. On 1 April 1519, the last Hun-
garian-Turkish cease-fire agreement was signed for the duration of three years 
with sultan Selim, who was engaged with the pacification of his empire after his 
large-scale conquests in the East. 
The situation changed fundamentally in September 1520, when sultan Selim I 
died, and was succeeded by his son, Suleyman I (the Magnificent). According to 
Turkish tradition the peace treaty made by the former ruler became invalid, so 
1 The period is dealt in detail in: F. Szakály, "A török-magyar küzdelem szakaszai a mo-
hácsi csata előtt (1365-1526)," [Phases of Turco-Hungarian Warfare before the Battle of 
Mohács (1365-1526)] in Mohács. Tanulmányok, ed. L. Rúzsás and F. Szakály, Budapest 
1986,11-57, and also see the literature there. 
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one of the first things the new sultan did was to send his envoy, Chiaus Behram 
to Hungary to renew the treaty. At least that is what the sultan said later. In the 
light of subsequent developments we can safely state that the real aim of the en-
voy was on the one hand to find out how deep-rooted was the Hungarians' de-
termination to withstand the Turks, on the other hand to lull the Hungarians into 
a false sense of security. The pretext for the declaration of war was the fact, that 
the Hungarian king did not give a definite answer to the peace offer of Chiaus 
Behram, but held him in a sort of respectable captivity in Buda, which was not at 
all an unusual practice in contemporary diplomacy. However, Suleyman consid-
ered this a casus belli, and in the spring of 1521, 65 years after the debacle of Bel-
grade, a Turkish army led by the sultan was heading towards Hungary. 
The events of the 1521 campaign are well known: Belgrade, Sabac and Zimony 
(by now a part of Belgrade) fell, and with this the Hungarian defence system 
practically collapsed. King Louis II summarised the situation in one of his letters 
in these words: "Our realm is now open to the Turks on rivers and on dry land, 
and will not be peaceful and pleasant until Belgrade and Sabac are in the hands 
of the enemy."2 In connection with this I still have to make the surprising conten-
tion, that from the Hungarian viewpoint the 1521 campaign should be considered 
as a partial success. My argument is based on the following. The objective of 
a war is the conquest of territories. To achieve this goal one must occupy certain 
fortresses of strategic importance, but occupation is not the goal, only a means to 
conquer the whole, or a large part of, the country. Consequently, the aim of the 
defensive party is to seek to prevent all this, in other words, to keep the fortresses 
of strategic importance to achieve the ultimate aim, the protection of territorial 
integrity. 
If we apply this train of thought to the 1521 campaign, we find that the Hun-
garian military command managed to reach the ultimate goal, they succeeded in 
protecting the territorial integrity of the realm (with the exception of Szeremseg, 
Sremska in present day Yugoslavia), but the fortresses of strategic importance fell 
victim to the war. Of course, this line of thought is only valid if I can prove that 
the Turks did not only want to occupy a few strongpoints, but wanted to break 
through deep into Hungary. That is, they did not only want a tactical, but meant 
to achieve a strategic breakthrough. 
In relation to this Turkish sources are extant, according to which the definition 
of Turkish military objectives took place in a military conference held in Sofia. 
During the conference the sultan stated that he wanted to march towards Buda 
itself and intended to break Hungary with a single decisive blow. However, the 
older and more experienced pashas, especially Grand Vizier Piri drew Suley-
man's attention to the fact, that it would be risky to lead the whole army against 
Buda without taking the border fortresses, primarily Belgrade.3 The most vulner-
able point of contemporary armies was the question of supply. If there were 
2 Acta Tomiciana. Vol. VII, Posnan 1857,306-307. 
3 J. Thury, Török történetírók. [Turkish Scriptors] Vol. II, Budapest 1896, 6-9, 42-46, 119-
145. 
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strongpoints in Hungarian hands along the supply lines of the Turkish army, 
these garrisons would make it impossible to supply the army with ammunition, 
food and fodder, which could have led to catastrophic defeat. Accordingly, the 
pashas advised the sultan to take the border fortresses first, and then, to march 
on towards the heart of the country. 
The sultan chose a combination of the two plans, and divided the troops into 
two army groups: Grand Vizier Piri surrounded Belgrade in the first days of July 
and started the siege, while the other army group launched the siege of Sabac, 
with the aim of taking it quickly, which would be followed by throwing a bridge 
over the river Sava, and intrusion into Hungary proper. The Turks managed to 
achieve only 50 percent of their plan. Although they took Sabac with a single at-
tack, and built the bridge over the river, Belgrade remained firmly Hungarian 
during the course of July. To make matters worse, the swollen river Sava swept 
away the bridge, causing supply problems for the troops, who had already bro-
ken into Sremska. The Turkish command received bad news from the reconnais-
sance units too: in the heart of the country at several points troops were massed 
with the aim of relieving Belgrade from the siege. 
The troops of Palatine István Báthory consisting of border defence units and 
battalions from southern Hungary were deployed between the rivers Danube 
and Tisza. János Szapolyai, voivode of Transylvania, who had originally pre-
pared for the defence of Transylvania proper, now having discovered the real 
Turkish intentions, lined up his forces along the river Tisza. The king left Buda in 
the middle of July, but marched slowly to make it possible for more soldiers to 
join his army. There were two factors, which made the centralisation of all forces 
nearly impossible. One of them was the huge extent of the territory to be de-
fended. When the Turks began their march, it was not clear, whether they would 
go for the west through the valley of the river Sava, or towards the heart of Hun-
gary, or towards Transylvania. It meant that troops should be held in reserve for 
the defence of all these territories. By the time it became clear where the Turks 
would strike, it was too late to concentrate the forces garrisoned along the long 
border. 
The other factor was the question of supply. Food and fodder were quite ex-
pensive before harvest. Most of the Hungarian army consisted of cavalry; horses 
needed an enormous amount of fodder, which was partly transported by the 
army itself, partly obtained in the vicinity of the theatre of war. Before harvest 
prices were higher, then they were considerably lower. Therefore a large part of 
the Hungarian army could only be mobilised in full force now and also in 1526 at 
the turn of July and August. 
The Turkish command being aware of these facts, decided to take Zimony af-
ter destroying smaller castles in Sremska, and then to concentrate their forces and 
to take Belgrade, which would be the prime achievement of the 1521 campaign. 
This decision was not made because they were afraid of the Hungarian army, 
which was anyway quite small (although it would be a mistake to underestimate 
its deterrent value), but because the river Sava had swept away the military 
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bridge, and because Belgrade was withstanding the siege even at the beginning 
of August. 
At this point, with all the Turkish forces concentrated around Belgrade, a sys-
tematic siege began, which consisted of round the clock bombardment of the bat-
tlements, attempts at scaling and sapping the walls. The defenders repelled all 
the attempts at scaling, repaired the destroyed bastions and towers, but their 
situation grew steadily worse and worse, first they had to give up the city, then 
the Turks managed to undermine and blow up the strongest bastion, so they had 
to withdraw to a tower. As their number fell to under seventy, and they were all 
wounded, and the food and water supply and the ammunition ran out, on 29 
August they gave up the fortress when free withdrawal was granted. Now the 
once proud stronghold of great fame resembled a heap of rubble and debris. 
The defenders cannot be blamed for the loss of the fortress; they did every-
thing they could to preserve it. But a successful defence cannot be guaranteed 
without a relieving force, in the absence of which static defence can fulfil its task 
for only a limited period of time. Why did the Hungarian army not relieve Bel-
grade? I have already referred to the problems of concentration of forces. At the 
moment Belgrade fell the Hungarian forces having grown to several ten thou-
sands were in camp at Mohács, which is about 130 miles from Belgrade. To cover 
this distance by forced marches an army would need at least 10 days, but in this 
case soldiers and horses would be exhausted. If they did not cover the distance at 
forced marches, 20 days would be needed. So the relieving army was simply un-
able to reach Belgrade in time to prevent its fall! According to some views the 
Hungarian command was reluctant to engage the Turks in pitched battle. This 
could really have been the case, but the underlying principle was not necessarily 
cowardice, but realistic calculation. Contemporary strategy was based on the tra-
dition of Vegetius (De Re Militari), according to whom one must avoid pitched 
battles because of their uncertain outcome. It would have been mere irresponsi-
bility to expose the only existing army of the country to almost certain defeat. 
In this situation the Hungarian command made the only possible decision: to 
wait until the main Turkish forces withdrew and then to attempt to recapture 
Belgrade. Accordingly, the army stayed in camp at Mohács and waited for the 
withdrawal of the Turks, which took place in the middle of September, as they 
did not intend to be caught up in further military operations in Hungary in this 
part of the year. Suleyman had Belgrade rebuilt, left a garrison of 3,000 there and 
began his long march home. Now the time was ripe to launch a campaign with 
the limited objective of retaking Belgrade. However, an epidemic broke out in the 
Hungarian camp, against which the only solution was to disband the army as 
soon as possible, but before that everybody made a vow to return the following 
year to attempt the recapture of Belgrade.4 
4 These events are discussed in detail in F. Szakály, "Nándorfehérvár, 1521: a vég kez-
dete," [Belgrade, 1521: The Beginning of the End] in F. Zay, Az Lándorfejirvár elveszésé-
nek oka e vót és így esött. Budapest 1980,85-153. 
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In 1522 the Turks were engaged in the siege of Rhodos, which could have of-
fered a good opportunity to try and achieve this plan. However, the country was 
paralysed by lack of financial resources. After the loss of Belgrade the king con-
vened the diet, which seemed to have realised how dangerous the situation was 
and an unprecedented high tax was offered, but people were reluctant to pay it 
the following year. To make matters worse/the king, in order to meet his short-
term financial needs, resorted to debasing of the currency, which totally ruined 
the country's economy. The king spent a greater part of 1522 in Bohemia to stabi-
lise his power there and to convince the estates to support his efforts against the 
Turks. 
Along the border open warfare began, fortunately the main Turkish forces 
were occupied elsewhere, so the Hungarians had to face only local Turkish units. 
Both sides managed to achieve successes in this struggle. In 1522 János Szapolyai, 
voivode of Transylvania broke into Wallachia, expelled the pro-Turkish voivode, 
and helped to crown a pro-Hungarian voivode. The most spectacular Hungarian 
victory was accomplished in 1523, as a result of the appointment of Pál Tomori as 
archbishop of Kalocsa. Tomori had been an excellent soldier before he entered the 
Order of Saint Francis. Now he became responsible for the organisation of the de-
fence of Lower-Hungary. Shortly after his accession to his see, in two battles in 
Sremska he defeated the army of Pasha Ferhat, who had been looting and pillag-
ing the country there.5 
Next year, however, the Turks gained an important victory by capturing the 
fortress of Szörény (now Turnu-Severin in Romania), the last Hungarian-held 
strongpoint on the Lower-Danube. With this, the first line of defence totally col-
lapsed, the only exception being Jajca (Jajce) in Bosnia, which held out until 1527. 
The lack of financial resources made it impossible to launch the offensive aimed 
at recapturing Belgrade, still, efforts were made to strengthen the line of defence. 
As a result of Tomori's resolution Titel, Szalánkemén and Pétervárad (now all in 
Yugoslavia) were strengthened to withstand gunfire. The latter could be counted 
as the main stronghold after the fall of Belgrade. 
In 1525 Jajca, which had been under nearly continuous siege, was on the verge 
of collapse. It was only at the last moment, when Kristóf Frangepán, a former 
condottiere in Italy managed to relieve it and supply into it with great difficulty. 
This feat of arms was the last success of the Hungarians before the battle of 
Mohács. 
At the beginning of 1526 reliable information arrived in Buda about the sul-
tan's determination to launch a decisive campaign against Hungary. Pál Bakics 
Serbian voivode, who had participated in the sultan's military conference, in 
which they discussed the ways and means to launch a campaign against Hun-
gary, fled to the Hungarian court. He informed the king about what was to be 
expected. Louis II established contact with all the rulers of Europe in order to 
5 A. Kubinyi, "A szávaszentdemeter-nagyolaszi győzelem 1523-ban (Adatok Mohács 
előzményeihez)," [The Victory Of Szávaszentdemeter-Nagyolaszi in 1523 (Data on the 
Precedents of Mohács)] Hadtörténelmi Közlemények (1978), 194-222. 
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obtain substantial help against the infidel.6 Because of the Habsburg-Valois an-
tagonism, which divided contemporary Europe no substantial aid could be given 
to Louis n. The king could rely only on Hungary's military force, but the mobili-
sation and concentration was hindered by the same factors as in 1521: the prelates 
and noblemen had to wait until the end of the harvest to deploy their units, and 
those units, which had been garrisoned along the border, were scattered and dif-
ficult to concentrate, as the Turks were careful enough to keep their military ob-
jectives in secret. Hungarian military command was hesitant, e. g. János Szapo-
lyai, voivode of Transylvania at first got an order to break into Wallachia and 
catch the Turks off balance, and then he received another, which instructed him 
to join the king's forces in Hungary. By the time he managed to find out that the 
latter order was correct and he managed to mobilise the Transylvanian troops 
(which faced the same problems as the ones in the rest of Hungary), it was too 
late. By that time the Turks were closer to the point of concentration than 
Szapolyai's forces. 
The sultan began crossing the River Sava at the beginning of July; then he 
marched towards Buda, following the line of the River Danube. He took all the 
castles in his way. The small fortifications did their best to slow down the enemy, 
but after a few days of resistance they had to be abandoned. Pétervárad (today 
part of Novi Sad, Yugoslavia) put up the strongest resistance, which lasted for 
two weeks. Pál Tomori, with his troops numbering about 4,000, had to watch 
passively the fall of Pétervárad from the other side of the River Danube, as they 
were too few to hinder it in any way. 
Meanwhile the main Hungarian forces were gathering in Tolna, then they 
marched to Báta, and finally to Mohács. A few days before a military conference 
was held, where they decided to engage the enemy in pitched battle, even in spite 
of the great numerical superiority of the Turks. Together with those reinforce-
ments, which arrived on the last day, there were about 24-25,000 troops with the 
king. Cautious estimates put the number of the Turkish army at 54-55,000, Pál 
Tomori estimated the combatant forces at 75,000. Contemporaries and military 
historians of later centuries agree that the Turkish army was followed by a huge 
number of secondary, auxiliary troops, whom Tomori called "a miserable rabble". 
If we take only the main forces into consideration, there was a two- or three-
fold numerical superiority. In such a situation the defensive party might have 
a fair chance of success. But due to its composition, the Hungarian army, consisting 
mainly of cavalry, was not apt for defence. In these circumstances there was only 
a very small chance of victory. The only factor the Hungarian army could rely on 
was the element of surprise. 
Because of the relative scarcity of sources we do not know much about the 
actual battle. In a study I made a new attempt at reconstructing the engagement 
6 See, e. g. F. Sebők, "Angol-magyar kapcsolatok a mohácsi vész időszakában," [Eng-
lish-Hungarian Relations at the Time of the Battle of Mohácsi Acta Histórica. Különszám 
(1991), 33-39. 
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by putting together the pieces of information we possess.7 What we know for 
sure is that the battle began with the attack of the Hungarian cavalry, which took 
the Turks by surprise, because they had thought that the engagement would take 
place the following day and had set about making camp. But by the time Tomori 
could deploy the second battle formation, the Turks had already managed to 
overpower the Hungarians and make them flee from the battlefield leaving about 
15,000 casualties behind. Subsequently the sultan could march on and take Buda 
without any serious resistance, then he crossed the Great Hungarian Plain be-
tween the rivers Danube and Tisza, and in October he left a devastated country 
behind. The withdrawing Turks were harassed by Szapolyai's Transylvanian 
troops, but they were unable to cause serious loss to the enemy. 
Summing up this phase of Turco-Hungarian warfare we can come to the con-
clusion that now the characteristics of the struggle have changed substantially. 
During the time of king Mathias seemingly equal forces faced each other, and the 
Hungarians were able to keep the Turks at bay. Now the overpowering military 
potential of the Turkish Empire began to make itself felt. Suleyman's father, 
Selim nearly doubled his realm, and he left a legacy to his son: to expand towards 
the west. Suleyman appeared in the European theatre of war and diplomacy as 
an opponent of the Habsburg dynasty (which meant that he was practically an 
ally of the Valois), and his main military objective was the capture of Vienna. In 
order to achieve this goal Hungary's resistance had to be destroyed first. By 1526 
Suleyman succeeded in breaking down Hungary, and he was confident, that the 
next step would be the siege and capture of Vienna. So the first great phase of 
Turco-Hungarian warfare ended in an unprecedented Turkish victory, and sev-
eral more decades were to pass, before it became clear that the Turkish Empire 
was unable to wipe out Hungary. The Turkish occupation, though it lasted for 
a long time, also marked the beginning of the long decay of the empire of the sul-
tans. 
7 F. Sebők, "Újabb szempontok a mohácsi csata megítéléséhez," [The Battle of Mohács 
from a new perspective] in "Magyaroknak eleiről". Ünnepi tanulmányok a hatvan esztendős 
Makk Ferenc tiszteletére, ed. F. Piti, Szeged 2000,457-471. 
